[lamford]

FrancesHinden, on 2011-October-29, 05:09, said:

I'm trying to work out under which section of the alerting rules a natural 2H bid could be alertable, as it is both natural and does not have a potentially unexpected meaning.

A pedant who thinks that 5B9 does not apply if there is another clause on the same subject would argue:

Under 5F1(a) A bid of a suit which shows that suit and does not show any other suit is considered 'natural' for alerting purposes. The 2H bid in 1S-1NT-2H shows both four hearts (or more) and a fifth spade (or more). However, the bid is correctly not alerted under 5B9. This is because of the general rule which clearly takes precedence over the specific rule.

A better example would be, uncontested, 1NT-2C(Stayman)-2S, showing four spades and two or three hearts in many methods. This would be alertable under 5F1(a), but 5B9 means it is not alerted as it can be assumed without discussion. I presume "show any other suit" means "give information about the length or strength of any other suit."

[mjj29]

lamford, on 2011-October-29, 04:15, said:

My argument is the same as yours - that something in the general section always applies. The rule states that if something can be assumed without discussion it is not alerted. It can be assumed that further rules stipulate the alerting procedure for anything that cannot be assumed without discussion.

I don't think it says that at all.

Two weeks ago I sat down at the University club and said to my (pick-up) partner "I assume we'll play something sensible". Does this mean that we shouldn't alert the 4 transfers, 'good raise' 2NT, splinters, doubles in positions which are alertable, michaels cue bids, gambling 3NT et al that we both assumed without discussion we were playing? Should we assume that the room full of new freshers also assumed those - or even knew we were playing without discussion? No, clearly things which we've assumed and are alertable should be alerted.

The EBU plays in a regime where alerts have specific meanings, rather than one where you alert where you think it's needed and as a result opponents can assume certain things from alerts or lack of alerts. Yes, you can not alert a bid where it's genuinely a guess - but none of those things above were guesses, we clearly both knew what they were going to be and, importantly, there's no reason for the opponents to know how much or little discussion we've had, they shouldn't have to ask for every unalerted bid 'have you explicitly agreed the non-alertable meaning for this bid'.

[Trinidad]

There is a simple logic why a specific rule has priority over a general rule.

Suppose that Lamford would be right and the general rule takes precedence. Then, it wouldn't make any sense to make the Lawbook thicker by writing specific rules. After all, the general rule would take precedence anyway and therefore specific rules are worthless.

Since the people who wrote the specific law cannot have done that for the sole purpose of making the law book thicker, it must have been put there to have a function. This can only be the case if the specific law takes precedence over the general law. Since this is the only way to construct laws that makes sense, it is the way laws are constructed. Specific laws take precedence over general laws. Here is a simple example:

General rule:
When a traffic light is red, traffic is supposed to stop.

Specific rule:
Emergency vehicles (with lights and sirenes) do not need to stop for red.

General rules are rules that work as the basis when there are no specific rules saying otherwise. You see them everywhere. My bridge club plays every Thursday (general rule), except during Carnaval (specific rule) since the location is used for partying people and during the Summer holidays (other specific rule) since everyone is on vacation. Another example: When you shop for groceries, you need to pay for them (general rule). If you shop at my grocery store and there are more than 4 people in line in front of you at the checkout counter, you don't need to pay. You get your groceries for free^* (specific rule).

Obviously, the principle that specific rules outrank general rules only applies when the general rule and specific rule -in principle- would be of the same rank. There are rules that are by definition higher ranking than others. (A constitution outranks a law and the bridge laws outrank regulations.)

Rik

^*Some restrictions apply, which are even more specific rules to the more general rule that you don't need to pay.

[lamford]

mjj29, on 2011-October-30, 02:31, said:

No, clearly things which we've assumed and are alertable should be alerted.

I have already acknowledged that implicit agreements are alertable, but we are told in the OP that there was no agreement over 2C followed by redouble. South "knew" it was for takeout, but we are not told whether that was by general bridge inference.

[lamford]

Trinidad, on 2011-October-30, 05:42, said:

General rule:
When a traffic light is red, traffic is supposed to stop.

Specific rule:
Emergency vehicles (with lights and sirenes) do not need to stop for red.

General rule:
Emergency vehicles may ignore all traffic signs and lights.

Specific rule:
Vehicles stop at red and go on green

It is possible to express anything as a general rule and anything as a specific rule, just by calling them that. I spoke to a couple of high-court judges - yes our club has three. They had no real view on the bridge reasons for the laws. But they were both of the opinion that the rule in General would apply. There are two ways of interpreting the laws:

a) Anything which you would assume without discussion, which has not been discussed and is not surprising, is not alertable, but there is a whole host of exceptions from OB5C following and they are alertable (or announced) or not, as specified.

b) Anything which you would assume without discussion, which has not been discussed and is not surprising, is not alertable. All other conventions or implicit agreements are alertable (or announced) or not as per OB5C following.

My view is that b) is the more logical interpretation. This thread seems to think that a) applies. Those having that opinion should therefore alert 1NT-2C-2S under 5F1(a) as it is not "natural", and the fact that one can assume it also shows exactly two or three hearts without discussion does not remove the obligation to alert it as 5F1(a) is the specific rule. Poppycock!

[RMB1]

If the specific rules take precedence over the general and the specific rules in Orange Book 5E/5F/5G cover all bids, pass, doubles and redoubles, when do the general rules in 5B ever apply?

[Trinidad]

lamford, on 2011-October-30, 10:30, said:

General rule:
Emergency vehicles may ignore all traffic signs and lights.

Specific rule:
Vehicles stop at red and go on green

You forgot the more general rule which makes clear that your "general rule" is actually specific:
General rule: "All vehicles need to obey the traffic signs and lights."
Specific rule: "Emergency vehicles may ignore all traffic signs and lights."

You could see the combination of these two rules as a definition of "emergency vehicle".

Rik

[lamford]

Trinidad, on 2011-October-30, 13:16, said:

General rule: "All vehicles need to obey the traffic signs and lights."

The general rule should never be wrong. The statement you make is not true in all cases, and therefore is bad law. It would be fine to say, "Except as listed in section 2 (say), all vehicles need to obey the traffic signs and lights."

The rule "General bridge inferences, like those a new partner could make when there had been no discussion beforehand, are not alertable, but a player must alert any inferences drawn from partnership experience or practice which have a potentially unexpected meaning." needs to be true. It would not be true if there were some general and expected bridge inferences that need to be alerted."

[blackshoe]

"Needs to be true"? Since when does a rule have needs?

[campboy]

lamford, on 2011-October-30, 14:19, said:

The general rule should never be wrong. The statement you make is not true in all cases, and therefore is bad law.

If the general and specific rule were not in conflict then we would not need to argue about which one took precedence. The general rule should never be wrong, but neither should the specific rule be wrong; which do we follow when one of them must be?

[Trinidad]

lamford, on 2011-October-30, 14:19, said:

Trinidad, on 2011-October-30, 13:16, said:

General rule: "All vehicles need to obey the traffic signs and lights."

The general rule should never be wrong. The statement you make is not true in all cases, and therefore is bad law. It would be fine to say, "Except as listed in section 2 (say), all vehicles need to obey the traffic signs and lights."

The rule "General bridge inferences, like those a new partner could make when there had been no discussion beforehand, are not alertable, but a player must alert any inferences drawn from partnership experience or practice which have a potentially unexpected meaning." needs to be true. It would not be true if there were some general and expected bridge inferences that need to be alerted."

General rules are allowed to be wrong. That is exactly what makes it a general rule. And general rules come with specific exceptions.

You may call that bad law, and in your ideal world there might be a clause of the form "Except as listed ...". The fact is, however, that often the general rule is formulated first while the exceptions are later improvements on the rule. Fixing laws in such a way that all later amendments are included in all general rules that are affected is practically impossible. Therefore, it would even be unwise to do that, since then some exceptions will be specifically listed in the general rule while others will be omitted.

Rik

[lamford]

Trinidad, on 2011-October-31, 03:06, said:

often the general rule is formulated first while the exceptions are later improvements on the rule.

That might be the case if the exceptions had been issued separately and afterwards, but the Orange Book was reissued in its entirety. As RMB1 states, all types of calls are covered by specific rules, so if they took priority over the general rules, then what would be the point of the latter? That was the most pertinent observation made on this thread, and I wish I had thought of it myself. It was far better than my feeble efforts to distinguish between general and specific rules.

[lamford]

campboy, on 2011-October-30, 18:20, said:

If the general and specific rule were not in conflict then we would not need to argue about which one took precedence. The general rule should never be wrong, but neither should the specific rule be wrong; which do we follow when one of them must be?

It is agreed that one of them must be wrong, and that suggests bad drafting. One or other should have had "except as in ..." or some such words added. Given that all definitions of "general law" contain words such as "a law that is unrestricted as to time, is applicable throughout the entire territory subject to the power of the legislature that enacted it, and applies to all persons in the same class", I argue that the general rule takes priority. However, I have asked a legal expert for his opinion, as that is only a lay view.

[bluejak]

lamford, on 2011-October-31, 10:52, said:

It is agreed that one of them must be wrong, and that suggests bad drafting.

Not necessarily. There is always pressure to shorten regulations - Trinidad's comments certainly would be more pithy and probably ruder if we did what you want. If you want general rules to be of the form "This applies, except when a b c d e f g apply" you merely make the book far longer and more confusing.

I am quite sure that you know perfectly well that specific rules outweigh general ones. You arguments neither convince me that you are right nor convince me that you believe you are right.

[lamford]

bluejak, on 2011-November-01, 08:17, said:

I am quite sure that you know perfectly well that specific rules outweigh general ones. You arguments neither convince me that you are right nor convince me that you believe you are right.

I do not think that specific rules outweigh general rules, and you fail to address RMB1's powerful argument that the general rules would not be there if the specific ones always applied. I contacted my good friend Professor Schiff, head of law at Queen Mary College, London, and author of a couple of books on the systems of Law. He is also an EBU club director at bridge, so will be able to view the issue in context; his reply:

Let’s us first consider this matter generally (not the general rule and then the specific examples that might operate as exceptions), but as a general matter.

One cannot exist and not exist at the same time – this is a matter of the law of contradiction.

But, can laws themselves be contradictory? They can easily be so if they operate within dynamic systems. Such systems create the conditions under which those with authority are entitled (authorised) to create or alter rules. They are authorised, and the rules that they create are authorised, and can be described as authorised even when they are contradictory. One can describe without contradiction an authorisation of two rules which are in themselves contradictory.

Contradictory rules are a common phenomenon. To exist and at the same time not to exist is an impossibility. But rules have a very different character – they are normative and operate within normative fields (they tell us what we must, can and may do – not what we will do).

This is the general background. It indicates that contradiction is normal, but may be manageable. Of course one cannot at the same time do both what one law requires and what another law that requires the opposite requires (here we are back to the law of contradiction). However, when faced with such a situation the rules themselves become available to interpretation that allow them to be, if not reconciled, then at least interpreted in such a way as to avoid such a contradictory result. Legal systems are full of interpretative practices that achieve this outcome (one case decides this, another decides that, which is to take precedence ... the later judgment, the judgment of the higher court, the judgment in which the substantial question was exactly the one in issue rather than the judgment in which the case was decided substantially on another issue).

The complexity of laws is such that the laws on one subject will often conflict with the laws on another subject – even the definitions of particular words are given different meaning in different areas of law.

Now I move on to the difference between rules of games and the ‘rules’ of a legal system. The latter are referred to as laws. The former, according to many legal theorists are ‘wrongly’ referred to as laws (even though we may call them, for example, the ‘laws’ of bridge). Others however, think of these two examples as rather similar, so both can appropriately use the word ‘laws’. Much flows from whether one does or does not consider this to be correct. If one does, then the interpretative practices of legal rules should apply as examples of how to interpret potentially contradictory rules of games – if one does not, then those interpretative practices may be inapplicable.

Here is an example of a legal rule of interpretation that can manage or avoid contradiction – the eisdem generis rule. (‘When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where "cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles" are mentioned, the word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense (therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes.)’ The example you give is a reverse example. (But note that many legal rules of interpretation deal with the later sections of statutes in light of what is said in earlier sections.)

One starts with the general and then finds particular situations which can appear to be exceptions. But, should these particular situations be treated as exceptions or, as far as possible, given an interpretation in line with the general provision?

With your particular example, I would opt for a ‘non-legal’ interpretation – by treating the rules of the game of bridge as not like the laws of a legal system. I would want to give an interpretation that helped to achieve some principle of fairness, in line with the ‘ethics’ of the game, rather than in line with the authoritative precedent (laws can be viewed as authorities, not open to further deliberation about the ‘ethics’ of the rule, since the rule itself (the passing of the law) has substantially ended the deliberative stage of reasoning in which such values are considered).

What does this opinion mean in practice, in relation to your example? I think that 5B9 gives a sense of what is fair. The further specific solutions continue along that line, trying to help with ‘fairness’. Contradiction (and 5E3(b) can be read as contradicting 5B9) is less relevant than arguments about what is ‘fair’ in line with the ‘ethics’ of the game. A director should exercise a broad discretion without too much concern for contradiction.

If I were the director I would say: if alerted, the alert does not contradict the amalgam of these rules, but also, if not alerted, that the non-alert does not contradict the amalgam of these rules. (Thus instead of contradiction, my amalgam of these two rules would operate to give a wide discretion). And what is the problem with that? One cannot advise people with clarity what they ‘should’ do. To which the answer is: that is what makes laws and rules of games different. It is more important in games to allow some discretion and lack of clarity in one’s rules, than in laws. And some of the rules will, on their face appear to be contradictory.

The rules are potentially contradictory, and that’s a good thing, in my view.

So, his view is that neither alerting nor failing to alert is an infraction, and I find his arguments compelling. He correctly avoids the issue of having to decide which of the general or specific rules takes priority.

[pran]

lamford, on 2011-November-01, 08:36, said:

I do not think that specific rules outweigh general rules[...]

There are many situations in life where two rules appears to be contradicting. And whether or not you believe it there is an established (usually unwritten) rule that more specific rules override general rules in such cases.

One example from everyday life that I trust nobody will have any problem understanding:

If in a traffic situation a traffic offfiser intructs you to drive through a red traffic light, or in a lane reserved for vehicles other than your kind of vehicle, or in any other way that is in conflict with the (general) highway code: Would you have any problem obeying his instructions?

I hope not, because the rule that tells you to obey instructions given by traffic offisers is a specific rule that overrides whatever general rules with which it might be in conflict.

You will hardly ever find any rule in the highway code that tells you do do or not do something unless a traffic offiser tells you otherwise. Instead you will probably find a rule that authorises traffic offisers to give instructions conflicting with other general rules in the highway code.

So please stop making up law or regulation problems where none exists.

[lamford]

pran, on 2011-November-01, 10:20, said:

If in a traffic situation a traffic offfiser intructs you to drive through a red traffic light, or in a lane reserved for vehicles other than your kind of vehicle, or in any other way that is in conflict with the (general) highway code: Would you have any problem obeying his instructions?

I hope not, because the rule that tells you to obey instructions given by traffic offisers is a specific rule that overrides whatever general rules with which it might be in conflict.

It is equally easy to argue that there is a general rule that you obey all instructions by traffic police. And a specific rule that you go on green or stop on red.

The general rule is the one that always applies. Look up a definition of "general law".

And everyone continues to ignore RMB1's argument that if the specific rules took priority the general rules would never apply.

So please stop making up law or regulation problems where none exists. And I shall not reply to this thread any more; we can just agree to differ.

[blackshoe]

lamford, on 2011-November-01, 10:50, said:

… a specific rule that you go on green or stop on red.

This would certainly explain the times I have stopped at a stop sign and waited for it to turn green.

[bluejak]

lamford, on 2011-November-01, 10:50, said:

And everyone continues to ignore RMB1s argument that if the specific rules took priority the general rules would never apply.

That is not true. The specific rules do not cover every situation, so when they do not, the general rules apply. You have just been given several examples of this.

[phil_20686]

Some remarks

(1) The concept of a general rule is itself an object of confusion. If I say "I generally shop at TESCOs", then that means that I would shop at tescos most of the time except in a few specific circumstances. If I say that "Theorem X is the general case of Theorem Y", then I mean that theorem X includes all of the special cases enumerated by theorem Y. Thus it sounds a lot like Lamford is a mathematician by training.

(2) Anyone who thinks XX is to play on this sequence is having a laugh.

(3) Lamfords point that in any case with only two or three outcomes one can exchange which is the general law and which is the specific law without altering much, but in RL the general law often applies to a huge number of unenumerated possibilities, from which the specific cases point out common exceptions. Lamfords friend has a very good point in that there are always uncommon exceptions, where the TD has no choice but to apply his judgement.

(4) I absolutely agree with Lamford's friend that on occasion you have to basically ignore the rulebook in order to achieve reasonable fair outcomes. (Sometimes because it is contradictory, and sometimes because it it doenst make any sense, and sometimes because the literal meaning is obviously not what was intended)