[EricK]

If you read a book about declarer play for intermediate or advanced players you are bound to come across hands where the opponents have bid and declarer uses this information to make the contract. Some books even go as far to claim things like "knowing the distribution from the outset should be worth a trick in the play" or "knowing where most of the outstanding points are should allow this low point count game to succeed", and use this to justify some slight, or even gross, overbidding.

It just doesn't seem to work out like that in real life. More often than not (especially if I have made a slight overbid based on this sort of reasoning, but even if I haven't), what happens is that knowing the distribution of suits or HCP from the outset just means that I know I am going down early in the hand rather than finding it out towards the end.

Now obviously knowing the distribution etc will allow you to make some more hands than otherwise, but it doesn't seem to be that many more in real life.

[cherdano]

Hmm. I love 3N on 23 hcp with well-placed honors after RHO opened the bidding.

I suppose your memory is selective and forgets the contracts you make on the known finesses (I can't imagine you forget to upgrade or downgrade your honors based on opponent's bidding).

[helene_t]

This is probably a personal thing, but I'm much better at making inference based on the bidding than at making inference based on the play (including remembering which cards are still out) so I find it much easier to declare if ops bid disciplined and disclose their methods. This is part of the reason why I bid so undisciplined myself.

Whether it's worth one trick on average, I don't know. Sounds like a mild exaggeration.

[EricK]

cherdano, on Apr 6 2007, 07:49 AM, said:

Hmm. I love 3N on 23 hcp with well-placed honors after RHO opened the bidding.

I suppose your memory is selective and forgets the contracts you make on the known finesses (I can't imagine you forget to upgrade or downgrade your honors based on opponent's bidding).

"Well placed honours" is a different phenomenon. In that case you know in the bidding that they are well placed. But if you had stumbled into the contract anyway with silent opps, you would probably still have made it because the honours are well placed. In the cases I am talking about, you play the hand in a different manner than otherwise because you know where things are from the outset.

I suppose in the case where there is an opening bid and you have a choice of finesses to take or a choice of direction to take the finesse, the opening bid will give you all the information you need. But that isn't the type of situation which is covered in the sort of books I am talking about!

[BillHiggin]

You use this sort of information in both the bidding and in the play of the hand. Just yesterday, after a 1C opening I overcalled 1H with Ax KQTxx Axx Jxx. When the auction continued (p) 1N (p), I raised to 3N based largly on the assumption that almost all of the opponents strength was in opener's hand and that player would be essentially endplayed at trick one. Partner held 3 kings, and had little trouble making the very skinny game simply because my assumption was correct.

The situation may not present itself very often, but you cannot take advantage of it if you are unaware. The advice in these books has made you aware. Take advantage of your new knowledge when the opportunity presents itself.

[kenrexford]

You may be missing the concept.

It is not necessarily the fact that you know the location of the HCP's and know the pattern that creates additional tricks. It does on many occasions, but not always, of course.

What this knowledge may do is to allow a beter valuation of your hand and fit, which can elevate or dminish values.

A simple example is frequent. You hold AQx. With no knowledge of anything else, the Queen is roughly worth 2/3 of a trick. If partner or RHO has the King, the Queen takes a trick. If LHO has the King, the Queen does not take a trick. Of course, this evaluation is slightly off, as the Queen may bolster a Jack into a trick, offer a second stopper, allow through-in options, operate as a menace, and the like.

However, if we know that RHO has almost all of the missing HCP's, and has bid the suit (even better), the Queen is of elevated value. Conversely, the reverse reduces the value of the Queen.

So, the bidding gives us new valuation for the Queen. Further, and of slightly less value (bnut bvalue nonetheless), even knowledge that the King is probably behind the Queen may be useful. This may, for instance, dissuade us from a losing finesse in favor of a confident squeeze or throw-in.

[pbleighton]

"You may be missing the concept.

It is not necessarily the fact that you know the location of the HCP's and know the pattern that creates additional tricks. It does on many occasions, but not always, of course."

Ken, you are missing the concept. The original post was specifcially about declarer play.

Peter

[kenrexford]

pbleighton, on Apr 6 2007, 10:43 AM, said:

"You may be missing the concept.

It is not necessarily the fact that you know the location of the HCP's and know the pattern that creates additional tricks. It does on many occasions, but not always, of course."

Ken, you are missing the concept. The original post was specifcially about declarer play.

Peter

"More often than not (especially if I have made a slight overbid based on this sort of reasoning, but even if I haven't), what happens is that knowing the distribution of suits or HCP from the outset just means that I know I am going down early in the hand rather than finding it out towards the end."

Actually, I'm fairly certain that the original post commented directly on bidding as affected by the declarer-play issues. It seems that the rant is based upon frustration from applying the Declarer play principles to justify aggressive bidding like the author of the book does and then being routinely set quite frequently. Maybe you are the one missing the concept, eh?

[pbleighton]

"Maybe you are the one missing the concept, eh?"

No, the post was about declarer play. Expert players can indeed get better results when the opponents have bid, though it's limited, probably not a trick per hand, and can't make up for bad bidding.

The issue is that the knowledge doesn't automatically translate to better results. You have to be a good enough declarer to take advantage of the additional knowledge. I remember a post a few years back from rgb. A poster was relating how he made it (luckily) into the final round of some world championship level event. His observation was that his opponents declared quite well when he and his partner didn't bid, but that they declared phenomenally well when he or his partner had bid.

This varies by level, a lot. As a reasonable club player I can sometimes be helped by the opponents' bidding, but better players than I are helped a more, and much better players are helped a lot more.

Perhaps you haven't noticed this, but it's actually quite well known.

Peter

[kenrexford]

The original post commented on the lack of frequency of the slim game making because of this info. The post noted an enhanced realization that the game was being set. The gripe was not that the information was difficult or useless in the declaring so much. The post was the reliance upon this new information yielded little net increase in slim contracts making.

Why would you think from this that I have not noticed the reality that inference is a gainer? That's a no-brainer.

[pbleighton]

"Why would you think from this that I have not noticed the reality that inference is a gainer? That's a no-brainer."

Because of the content and tone of your posts in this thread. That's a no-brainer.

Peter

[barmar]

I think it's a mistake interpret the books as saying that the inferences from the bidding will allow you to make unmakable contracts. Rather, what it does is give you a better shot at making the close ones. For instance, slim contracts often require you to choose a play that depends on a particular "lucky" lie of the cards. Inferences from the bidding can guide you towards finding the right line of play, assuming that there is one.

You can view this similarly to the "danger hand" principle in selecting finesses. Finessing through the danger hand doesn't necessarily mean that you'll make your contract. But if it's a pure guess which finesse to take, you should do so, since it minimizes the damage from a wrong guess (and in some hands you can afford to lose the finesse, you just can't afford to lose it to the wrong opponent).

[whereagles]

Very often, when I mess up a hand and go down, I find some hint in the post-mortem that pointed in the right direction.

The trick is to be able to follow inferences BEFORE playing the cards

[cherdano]

EricK, on Apr 6 2007, 02:18 AM, said:

cherdano, on Apr 6 2007, 07:49 AM, said:

Hmm. I love 3N on 23 hcp with well-placed honors after RHO opened the bidding.

I suppose your memory is selective and forgets the contracts you make on the known finesses (I can't imagine you forget to upgrade or downgrade your honors based on opponent's bidding).

"Well placed honours" is a different phenomenon. In that case you know in the bidding that they are well placed. But if you had stumbled into the contract anyway with silent opps, you would probably still have made it because the honours are well placed. In the cases I am talking about, you play the hand in a different manner than otherwise because you know where things are from the outset.

I suppose in the case where there is an opening bid and you have a choice of finesses to take or a choice of direction to take the finesse, the opening bid will give you all the information you need. But that isn't the type of situation which is covered in the sort of books I am talking about!

Maybe in what I said, not quite in what I meant. This well-placed honors are only so effective because you know what to do with them - endplay RHO multiple times, play for both Q and A onside if you have KJx, etc.

[pbleighton]

"The trick is to be able to follow inferences BEFORE playing the cards"

Yup.

Tough trick, when you find out how to do it consistently, let us know.
You could sell a LOT of books

Peter

[inquiry]

EricK, on Apr 6 2007, 02:37 AM, said:

If you read a book about declarer play for intermediate or advanced players you are bound to come across hands where the opponents have bid and declarer uses this information to make the contract. Some books even go as far to claim things like "knowing the distribution from the outset should be worth a trick in the play" or "knowing where most of the outstanding points are should allow this low point count game to succeed", and use this to justify some slight, or even gross, overbidding.

It just doesn't seem to work out like that in real life. More often than not (especially if I have made a slight overbid based on this sort of reasoning, but even if I haven't), what happens is that knowing the distribution of suits or HCP from the outset just means that I know I am going down early in the hand rather than finding it out towards the end.

Now obviously knowing the distribution etc will allow you to make some more hands than otherwise, but it doesn't seem to be that many more in real life.

I find it amazing to read this rant. Are you saying you prefer to have no clues about the hand from bidding as to distribution or hcp location? Books always show how to use such clues to your advantage. I am not sure I have ever seen one telling you to "overbid" because your opponents bid something, but of course, upevaluation for honor location is useful. And i don't know if I have ever seen someone say when your opponents bid and you buy the contract, it is worth an extra trick to you, on average.

Perhaps it is worth that or more on some hands, on others, like you said knowing doesn't help. But more often than not it does. And the more experience you have, the more weapons you will have to take advantage of the info. If you never heard of a backwash squeeze, the fact that the bidding might point out that a hand will make on one will be of no value to you.

And of course, the books are desgined to teach the principles of figuring out location of honors or how to handle expected "bad suit splits". Sooooo many real world hands can be book hands. Even JDonn's hand could be a book hand, but instead of a defensive one, it would be an offensive one, where south gives a trump trick to gain access to dummies winners.

[EricK]

Let me rephrase my rant and perhaps add another one for good measure.

Every clue obviously helps you to make the hand when it can be made. But if the hand can't be made then all the clues in the world won't help, and if the hand always makes on correct play (where "correct" is determined just with regards to your hand and dummy's) then any extra clues are technically superfluous. So really these clues only help on a small number of hands - those hands where the correct play (as defined above) loses and there is an alternative winning play and that winning play can be deduced from the clues. I am merely questioning what proportion of hands that is. Is it really >50% (as Ben implies with "more often than not")?

On to my second rant which is about books of actual hands (eg Bridge with the Blue Team etc). Here you will often see hands where they have bid to a bad contract and yet made it with their skillful play. That is all well and good, but it does leave some questions unanswered. Take one kind of such hand - it appears absolutely hopeless at first glance, but there is a particular distribution of opposing cards which allows it to make - thus making the hand in reality, say, a 5% chance, and obviously in the book it all works. Now well done to them for spotting that chance. But shouldn't an examination of all their hands show 19 similar hands where the 5% chance didn't come off? If so, how on earth did they win anything if they landed in so many bad contracts?

[skjaeran]

EricK, on Apr 7 2007, 08:40 AM, said:

On to my second rant which is about books of actual hands (eg Bridge with the Blue Team etc). Here you will often see hands where they have bid to a bad contract and yet made it with their skillful play. That is all well and good, but it does leave some questions unanswered. Take one kind of such hand - it appears absolutely hopeless at first glance, but there is a particular distribution of opposing cards which allows it to make - thus making the hand in reality, say, a 5% chance, and obviously in the book it all works. Now well done to them for spotting that chance. But shouldn't an examination of all their hands show 19 similar hands where the 5% chance didn't come off? If so, how on earth did they win anything if they landed in so many bad contracts?

The last question is easy.

The rest of the field landed in an even higher number of bad contracts, and didn't manage to make as many contracts, good or bad, or beat as many on defense either.

[Winstonm]

A lot of this may have to do with the quality of opponent. I have never been very good at "rabbit killing", as I have a strong tendency to give opponents credit for their bids/plays - this works well with good players, who have logical reasons for their plays and bids but works poorly against weaker players.

[kenberg]

To the extent that I am a better player now than I was sometime back, I think it is mainly that I am better at assessing what is going on. Of course it doesn't always help, and even sometimes leads you astray, but I think that learning to draw inferences from bids and plays, made and unmade, is far more useful than studying compound squeezes. I haven't kept any statistics so this is an opinion. But I seem to remember Reese expressing a similar opinion in "Play Bridge with Reese".

I'll go out a little way on a limb and guess that poster is mostly claiming that the miracles that occur in books are somewhat overhyped. I suppose so. A guy writes a book about an area of bridge that interests him. He probably won't present his thoughts as "Now here is a useless piece of crap I want to bore you with". Generally I find books about inferences to be the most interesting to read and, I think, the most likely to give me something useful. But that's me, now.