Your bid?
#1
Posted 2004-November-20, 23:51
Qxxx
Jxxxx
xx
Qx
(1S) 2H (P) ?
#2
Posted 2004-November-21, 00:34
Otherwise, I would bid 3H.
Peter
#3
Posted 2004-November-21, 00:35
#4
Posted 2004-November-21, 02:12
nick
sydney
#5
Posted 2004-November-21, 03:51
Partner has not doubled, RHO has not raised spades, entries to my hand are very poor and so I will only raise competitively giving partner the option of getting it wrong.
Very tough decision.
Paul
#6
Posted 2004-November-21, 04:42
#7
Posted 2004-November-21, 07:12
I agree with 4H, but the fourth spade reduces the volume considerably
Peter
#8
Posted 2004-November-21, 07:37
Here RHO passed, so I will pass too. If there is some balance, I will bid 3H later, but not now.
YOu can imagine def starts with spade lead, and you lose three spade tricks quickly. It is even possible they have a trump uppercut.
#9
Posted 2004-November-21, 07:41
Pass = 20% of the time
3H = 20% of the time
3N = 25% of the time
4H = 15% of the time
5H = 20%
The relatively uniform distribution suggests a very tough hand with no clear favorite bid.
#10
Posted 2004-November-21, 10:26
hrothgar, on Nov 21 2004, 01:41 PM, said:
Pass = 20% of the time
3H = 20% of the time
3N = 25% of the time
4H = 15% of the time
5H = 20%
The relatively uniform distribution suggests a very tough hand with no clear favorite bid.
mixed strategy is right only if the payoff to all these bids are same. This is impossible in the given sequence.
#11
Posted 2004-November-21, 10:33
flytoox, on Nov 21 2004, 07:26 PM, said:
Mixed strategy is right only if the EXPECTED payoff is the same
#12
Posted 2004-November-21, 10:39
#13
Posted 2004-November-21, 11:25
hrothgar, on Nov 21 2004, 04:33 PM, said:
flytoox, on Nov 21 2004, 07:26 PM, said:
Mixed strategy is right only if the EXPECTED payoff is the same
RIght. still, here how can you have a mixed strategy? Strictly speaking, this is a decision makig problem. There is no strategic interaction here. Cos so far pd and opp's decicision didnt rely on your bid of, from pass to 5H.
#14
Posted 2004-November-21, 12:27
#15
Posted 2004-November-21, 12:35
nickf, on Nov 21 2004, 12:12 AM, said:
nick
sydney
I think the balanced nature of the hand reduces the TT by at least one, maybe more, since my ODR isn't great.
#16
Posted 2004-November-21, 13:07
flytoox, on Nov 21 2004, 05:25 PM, said:
hrothgar, on Nov 21 2004, 04:33 PM, said:
flytoox, on Nov 21 2004, 07:26 PM, said:
Mixed strategy is right only if the EXPECTED payoff is the same
RIght. still, here how can you have a mixed strategy? Strictly speaking, this is a decision makig problem. There is no strategic interaction here. Cos so far pd and opp's decicision didnt rely on your bid of, from pass to 5H.
What a mixed strategy gives you is not different bids for this hand but different hands for each of your bids. If 4♥ is always 5 card support, 3♥ is always 4 card support, 2♠ is always strong with 3 card support etc it gives the opponents too easy a time.
Eric
#17
Posted 2004-November-21, 13:16
flytoox, on Nov 21 2004, 08:25 PM, said:
Bridge bidding can can/should be modeled as a multi-stage game. The set of available bids and definition of the available bids is contingent on earlier stages of the game.
You are completely correct that the specific meaningss of bids during earliier stages of the game do not change based on my current bid. However, my choice of bids this round will very much impact future bids by the opponents.
As a simple illustration, the entire problem can be considered as equivilent to output choices in a Stackelberg Equilibrium...
#18
Posted 2004-November-21, 13:20
hrothgar, on Nov 21 2004, 07:16 PM, said:
Well, I'm glad that has clarified matters...
#20
Posted 2004-November-21, 13:31
EricK, on Nov 21 2004, 10:20 PM, said:
hrothgar, on Nov 21 2004, 07:16 PM, said:
Well, I'm glad that has clarified matters...
In Economics, one of the "classic" problems studies how firms decide the quantity that they should produce. Historically, economists focused on two polar extremes:
Under perfect competition, the number of firms is assumed to be infinite.
Under monopoly there is only one firm.
Both of these extreme conditions make life very easy since there is no "strategic" interaction. The output decision of the firm being studied does not depend on the output decision of any other firm.
Life gets much more complicated when one is studying "Oligopoly". Here, the output decision of one firm depends on the decisions made by other economic actors. Here, the simpliest model is so-called Cournot Duopoly. A Stackelberg equilibirum is a more complex condition in which one firm is assumed to have a dominant market position. The behaviour of other firms is conditional on the decisions made by the Stackelberg leader.
Stackelberg's model provides a good basic introduction to the dynamics introduced by multi-stage games...

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