Poker
#1
Posted 2007-July-29, 06:35
I found the complaints about game theoretic betting methods rather interesting.
#2
Posted 2007-July-29, 07:03
Peter
#3
Posted 2007-July-29, 08:37
My question is, if people start winning the Vanderbilt and similar tourneys who have previously played only online, will we hear the same complaints from the pros in bridge?
#4
Posted 2007-July-29, 08:51
jtfanclub, on Jul 29 2007, 05:37 PM, said:
My question is, if people start winning the Vanderbilt and similar tourneys who have previously played only online, will we hear the same complaints from the pros in bridge?
My impression is that the core of complaints in the article was about style of play.
Online poker is significant because it provides a good interface between analytic computer tools and an enormous number hand records. In turn, this has allowed players to develop some much more sophisticated strategies.
The author also believes that said strategies detract from his (idealized) version of the game.
#5
Posted 2007-July-29, 09:14
Sponsors also consider risking $$$ for a 5% single hand chance stupid, and those players tend to find the sponsorship dry up.
Notes the article mentions "great players, Bobby Baldwin" - some here will remember when Bobby was playing online bridge.
#6
Posted 2007-July-29, 09:57
officeglen, on Jul 29 2007, 06:14 PM, said:
Game theory is not the same as constrained maximization.
I agree completely that the "best" strategy is the one that counteracts the strategy that the other player is employing. However, this isn't necessarily a game theory problem.
Game theory specifically requires that the other player is behaving in an optimal manner.
#7
Posted 2007-July-29, 10:03
It is not as if the players have nothing to lose - they risk losing being backed in future if they don't win.
#8
Posted 2007-July-29, 10:30
When I was playing, the buy-in for the World Series was $10,000 - regardless of what happened when you bet or called $100,000, $10K was your maximmum risk of loss. Risk became even more irrelevant if you had a backer or if you had won a satellite to get in - then the total risk was even less. Tournament play is like paying $1 to win $100.
Playing live, the amount you put on the table is your risk. The psychology of real money loss is what propelled people like Doyle Brunson to adopt tactics that placed the opponent into choices for "all his marbles" - over the years, he had learned that many players simply don't have the courage to bet or call with all their money unless holding the stone nuts. And it isn't easy to make the stone nuts hand after hand.
A true story: Many years ago I was playing stud at Caesar's Palace and a tourist asked the dealer how he came to live in Las Vegas. The dealer, Charlie, said he had been a no-limit poker player and he added that "When you get raised $80,000 dollars, it make you reevauate your hand."
The tourist replied, "Hell, that makes you reevaluate your life."
Exactly. And if you reevaluate incorrectly, you end up a dealer at Caesar's. That is the difference between live and tournament. Night and day.
#10
Posted 2007-July-29, 15:55
jtfanclub, on Jul 29 2007, 09:37 AM, said:
i couldn't disagree more... it's far more complicated than you're suggesting and it's far from being "solved" ... can you explain why you say that?
officeglen said:
yep, except the kill phil strategy might have an advantage in small S & G tourneys where it's used early on to build a bankroll, and then switch strategies once that's accomplished.. the advantage is, you can just put up another 6 bucks and play another if you bust out
winston said:
absolutely, a tourney and a ring game are totally different and require different strategies... that said, some players (chris ferguson is one) play the two in the same way - at least he says he does
#11
Posted 2007-July-29, 16:37
luke warm, on Jul 30 2007, 12:55 AM, said:
jtfanclub, on Jul 29 2007, 09:37 AM, said:
i couldn't disagree more... it's far more complicated than you're suggesting and it's far from being "solved" ... can you explain why you say that?
I don't know whether or not anyone has formally solved Texas Hold'Em. I do agree with the claim that Hold'Em is a fairly simplistic game. Its certainly much less complicated than most other forms of poker (or, for that matter, bridge).
Each player is sharing the same three community cards. The only thing that distinguishes their hands are the two unique hole cards that they hold. Furthermore, you only have four rounds of betting.
There's not too much to the game. In theory, it can all be modeled as a linear programing problem and crunched.
If there isn't a solution, I suspect that it boils down to the size of the matrix. While this is a simple game, you have a hell of a lot of different card combinations out there. Solving the resulting matrix might very well be computationally prohibitive.
For what its worth, the real complexity in games like Texas Hold'Em is trying to derive optimal strategies to exploit suboptimal play by your opponents. Once you start allowing sub-optimal play and allow yourself to get "greedy" by deviating away from the equilibrium strategy life gets hard.
#12
Posted 2007-July-29, 23:29
luke warm, on Jul 29 2007, 04:55 PM, said:
jtfanclub, on Jul 29 2007, 09:37 AM, said:
i couldn't disagree more... it's far more complicated than you're suggesting and it's far from being "solved" ... can you explain why you say that?
For any given hand, you can give an exact % chance of winning against one random opponent, two, three, etc. There simply aren't that many combinations, and many are effectively the same. A computer can easily tell you the odds of succeeding for any given set against a given number of opponents.
That's what I mean by solved.
I believe that most human professionals have it pretty much solved as well. Give them a hand, with or without a flop, and the number of opponents and they can tell you what their odds are.
Now, obviously, that has nothing to do with the human or the gambling element. But once you have the card element down, then the actual mechanics of the game are superfluous. You could just as easily draw one card, bet, draw a second card, bet, and draw a third card, and then high card wins (second highest on ties), at which point you're basically betting on War.
Try to imagine playing bridge where you had a handy supercomputer to do your calculating. When the dummy came down, it would give you the play to make and the %, best play to make an overtick and the %, best for down 1, etc. Then you'd just select which one you'd like to play for and it'd play it for you, and the defenders (with their supercomputers) would play as well. That's what Texas Hold Em feels like to me. It's poker without all that messy thinking about the cards, at least at the highest levels (or on the computer where you can ask it the odds).
In contrast, think about Draw Poker. You have KKQJT, all in hearts except one of the kings. Do you throw the offsuit King, or the QJT? You may think you know the answer. You're wrong. It depends on how many opponents you have at the table, and whether they would settle for a pair or pitch to try to make a flush or straight.
Does that make more sense?
#13
Posted 2007-July-30, 04:42
#14
Posted 2007-July-30, 09:27
Quote
I understand, and I'm sorry I wasn't clear. When I said it was solved, I'm talking only about winning a hand given the flop and the number of people in (and the size of the pot). The actual card game is a nothing.
Quote
It's dependent on patterning- how often the person has previously bet, how much, and how often he's folded. That's actually not what I was talking about either when I said it was solved, but apparently that's been solved too.
#15
Posted 2007-July-30, 10:47
luke warm, on Jul 30 2007, 01:42 PM, said:
Please reference my last post in which I discussed the number of betting rounds as an explicit component of the linear programming model.
Even with all the points that you mentioned taken into account, Hold'Em is still fairly simple. Off the popular poker variants that I know of, I'd say that
1. 5 card draw is the easiest to model
2. Some version of seven card stud is probably the nastiest. (You have lots of rounds and lots of information available each round)
Compare Hold'Em to 7 card stud.
1. You have fewer betting rounds
2. You don't have to factor in nearly as much unique information about each round
(For the record, when I am talking about "Solved" I'm talking about a Nash equilibirum)
#16
Posted 2007-July-30, 16:06
jtfanclub, on Jul 29 2007, 09:37 AM, said:
That may actually be more interesting than televised Bingo, which is on a Major US Network.
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#17
Posted 2007-July-30, 17:03
jtfanclub, on Jul 30 2007, 10:27 AM, said:
Quote
It's dependent on patterning- how often the person has previously bet, how much, and how often he's folded. That's actually not what I was talking about either when I said it was solved, but apparently that's been solved too.
i understand what you're saying, i'm just having trouble understanding how patterning enters into it... for example, doyle will sit down and play extremely loosely for an hour or so, often losing his first buy in... then he'll buy more chips and switch strategies, knowing his earlier play has given him a certain table image... it seems to me that patterning your bets to his would fail to take into account his switching of strategies, something he does off and on all session... i know that's a simplistic example, that's why i said i believe it's more complicated than it appears
also, it's impossible to ignore the gambling aspect of it... for example, imagine a 6 handed game, you're under the gun with pocket queens... you raise 3x the BB, 4 people fold, and the BB raises you all in... what do you do, assuming the bet is large enough to trouble you? how about if you *knew* he had either pocket aces, pocket kings, or AK suited?
i'm interested in case we ever play
#18
Posted 2007-July-31, 03:29
luke warm, on Jul 30 2007, 06:03 PM, said:
That's the only aspect of it that's left, at the highest levels.
Quote
I don't know much about pattern theory, but I believe that it works on last hand pattern. ie., if he's been conservative the last few hands, bet that he stays conservative. If he's been free, bet he stays free. If he's been alternating, bet he keeps alternating. Yes, he'll catch you when he switches patterns, but he remains constant far more often than he switches, so you'll win more often than you lose.
I don't play hold 'em, sorry.
#19
Posted 2007-July-31, 05:32
As I learned poker, it can basically be reduced to:
- both players draw a number from the uniform [0;1] distribution.
- the dealer choses to lose the ante or to raise to twice the ante.
- if the dealer raises, the non-dealer choses to lose the ante or to raise to twice the ante. In the latter case, the one with the highest number wins.
It seems to me that the above described game can be easily solved. You can make all kinds of generalizations. For example, we usually played that you could trade any number of cards, sometimes for free, sometimes at the cost of an additional ante. Now your strategy should factor in the number of cards traded by the other player(s). You can allow the non-dealer to raise to more than twice the ante in which case the dealer can chose to lose twice the ante or to raise again etc. And you can play with more than two players. In any case, it doesn't seem particularely interesting to me.
#20
Posted 2007-July-31, 06:22
luke warm, on Jul 31 2007, 02:03 AM, said:
also, it's impossible to ignore the gambling aspect of it... for example, imagine a 6 handed game, you're under the gun with pocket queens... you raise 3x the BB, 4 people fold, and the BB raises you all in... what do you do, assuming the bet is large enough to trouble you? how about if you *knew* he had either pocket aces, pocket kings, or AK suited?
i'm interested in case we ever play
Note my earlier comments about trying to exploit suboptimal play by your opponents (and the complexities involved).
It might be (easier) to illustrate this with an example using a very simple game like "Rock, Paper, Scissors" rather than a poker variant.
Rock, Paper, Scissors has a very simple, well known equilibirum. Players should randomize across the three choices with equal weights. Each time I play, I roll a "fair" D6. If a 1 or a 2 crops up, I chose Rock. If a 3 or a 4 crops up, I chose Paper. If a 5 or a 6 crops up, I chose Scissors. It can be demonstated that a situation in which both players adopt this strategy satisfies the criteria for a Nash Equilibirum. (This is a fancy way of stating that neither player has an incentive to change their strategy)
Now, lets assume that we know that we are playing against an opponent who has deviated from the "optimal" strategy. Hypothetically, he is playing
Rock if he rolls a 1
Paper if he rolls a 2 or a 3
Scissors if he rolls a 4, a 5, or a 6
In this case, we should adjust our strategy and always chose "Rock". However, as I have noted before, this isn't a game theory problem.
Life gets even more complicated if we're dealing with a finite repeated version of a game in which players could be attempting to establish a reputation for a certain style of (suboptimal) play that they can exploit later on in the game. In general, the solution to this type of problem (initially) requires solving the "one off" version. At this point in time, you need to study whether or not the equilbirum to the one off version is stable or unstable. In many cases, if you're dealing with a stable equilbirum, you can safely ignore a player's attempts to portray himself as "loose" or "tight" or whatever.

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